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The Human Costs 
of NAFTA 
"There is as much injustice in 
the equal treatment of unequal 
cases as there is in the unequal 
treatment of equal cases." 




The proposed North American Free Trade Agreement between the United States, Canada, and Mexico is the logical and perhaps inevitable extension of the 1989 Free 1fade Agreement between the United States and Canada. 
Both agreements are controversial, and massive public opposi, 
tion exists in all three countries-for good reasons, as we shall 
see. 
The citizens of these three nations have never been pro' 
vided with a credible explanation of the need for NAFTA. 
Contrary to the proclamations of NAFTA's proponents, there 
are no guarantees that the supposed benefits of the free,trade 
agreement will be realized, nor is it clear who will gain and 
who will lose. The potentiallong,term economic benefits are 
merely assumed to exceed the short,term adjustment costs, 
so that everybody will eventually gain (the so,called "win,win" 
scenario). How this will occur is a mystery, since there are 
no provisions in the agreement for the potential winners to 
compensate the potential losers. Once again, the dubious 
mechanism of "trickle,down" is expected to do the job. Beyond 
all this, it is debatable whether NAFTA will further free 
trade at all. In fact, a strict interpretation of the economic 
theory of free trade, classical or neoclassical, would indicate 
otherwise. 
NAFTA can be viewed as yet another official reaction to 
a deepening global economic crisis, as well as an integral 
part of the emerging "new world order." Despite widespread 
democratic opposition, strategies like NAFTA are put on the 
"fast track" and hurriedly implemented with support from 
numerous officially sanctioned (and subsidized) reports, but 
with no open discussion or debate and little time for scholarly 
analysis or critique. Official domination of information appears 
to be an essential part of the brave new world order that is 
unfolding. 
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Statistics from international organi, 
zations (the United Nations, the 
World Bank, and the International Monetary Fund, among 
others) confirm that the global economy has been in a state 
of crisis since the mid,1970s. The average annual global rate 
of growth, approximately 5 percent in the years following World 
War II, has fallen to less than half that amount in the last two 
decades. Worse, zero growth has been recorded for the last 
several years, and only more of the same is predicted for the 
near future. No country or region of the world has been exempt 
from this phenomenon-not the United States or Europe, not 
Japan, not the Soviet Union, and certainly not Mexico or the 
rest of Latin America. 
Paradoxically, while everyone admits to an interdependent 
global economy, each national or regional crisis is conveniently 
treated as unique and unrelated. In this way, the impact that 
, the policies of the industrialized countries have upon the rest 
of the world are either ignored or denied. The facts, however, 
do not support this position. The Latin American debt crisis 
is a prime example: in 1979, Argentina's foreign debt was on' 
ly $8 billion, Mexico's a manageable $29 billion, and Brazil's 
$36 billion. In October 1979, the U.S. Federal Reserve Board 
immoderately raised the real rate of interest (adjusted for 
inflation). From an average ofless than one percent since 1973, 
the rate speedily rose to more than 10 percent in 1981 and 
16 percent in the first half of 1982. Compound these high in' 
terest rates over time, factor in the global recession, and the 
rest is history: Mexico's foreign debt today is over $100 billion 
despite the Brady Plan, "debt equity swaps," rescheduling, and 
other measures designed to reduce it. 
This monetarist policy had the intended effect of reduc, 
ing inflation in the United States. For the remainder of the 
decade, a debt,financed recovery from the 1981-1982 reces, 
sion was achieved with the help of capital flight (see glossary, 
p. 5) and cheaper commodity imports from Latin America. 
However, the cost to the United States of 1980s "prosperity" 
was high and has yet to be paid. Government deficits sky, 
rocketed, a $500 billion savings,and,loan crisis resulted, and 
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enormous trade deficits changed the United States from a global 
creditor to the world's largest debtor. Budget and trade deficits 
averaging more than $200 billion a year eventually quadrupled 
the US. national debt to $2 trillion. Meanwhile, family incomes 
stagnated, income inequality worsened, and unemployment and 
poverty increased. 
In Mexico and the 
other nations of Latin 
America, these very 
same factors-high in-
terest rates, capital 
flight, recession, and 
low commodity prices 
-combined to form a 
vicious cycle of debt, 
deficits, devaluations, 
a~d negative growth 
rates from which they 
have yet to escape. By 
1982, an estimated $93 
billion, much of it 
money controlled by 
NAFTA is but the latest 
attempt to restore Us. 
hegemony in the 
global economy and a 
stability in the hemi-
sphere congenial to 
U.s. corporate interests. 
multinational corporations operating in Latin America, had 
been moved from the region-$36 billion from Mexico alone. 
Since then, total capital flight has risen to more than $400 
billion, $50 billion of it from Mexico. Between 1981 and 1988, 
total debt for the region increased by about 40 percent, and 
the net transfer of capital (via interest payments) reached a 
level of 4.1 percent of the gross domestic product per annum. 
By way of comparison, the punitive net transfer of capital forced 
upon Germany after World War I by the 1919 Treaty of Ver-
sailles was only 2.5 percent of the GDP. 
Thus, high interest rates and capital flight-not failed 
development policies or public (state-run) enterprises-were 
responsible for the Mexican debt crisis of the 1980s. History 
will also record that the "stabilization" and "structural-adjust-
ment" programs imposed on Mexico by the International 
Monetary Fund were disastrous "solutions" to both the debt 
crisis and the larger dilemma of Latin American development. 
The social legacies of the debt and of the IMF programs that 
followed have been a more unequal distribution of income, in-
creased unemployment, and greater absolute poverty. To cite 
just one grim example: according to a United Nations FAO 
report, an estimated 40 percent of the Mexican population was 
suffering from malnutrition by 1983. 
The contemporary global crisis and the failed economic 
policies which contributed to it are the requisite background 
for a comprehension of NAFTA. This trilateral free-trade 
initiative is but the latest attempt to restore US. hegemony 
in the global economy and a stability in the hemisphere that 
is congenial to US. corporate interests. The overall strategy, 
crafted by orthodox economists and implemented by conserva-
tive administrations, has been first to test economic policies 
in the United States and then to impose them abroad as condi-
tions for foreign loans. They have been able to do this by taking 
advantage of the new "window of opportunity" presented by 
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hd I ... 'Ii 'M' L' t e esperate economic situatIOn preval ng meXICO, atm 
America, and els~where in the world (a situation, ironically, 
which they help9d to create). 
These establi~hment economists loudly and repeatedly pro-
claim that all economic problems everywhere in the world have 
a common cause! they are said to be the inevitableconse-
quences of deJiating from the private, free,market system 
which alone gbarantees efficiency, stability, and growth. 
Therefore, the~e economists argue, it is imperative that exist-
ing institution and policies be replaced with those found 
in their model. Private enterprise, deregulation, and free 
trade comprisel the ideological foundation of this structure. 
Although it is rarely admitted, this neoclassical theory 
is riddled withlrhetoric and disguised politics; it is also not 
easily adapted to the complexities of the contemporary 
global econom~. Consequently, this theory (and the policies 
which it prescr"bes) often produces, in practice, unexpected, 
paradoxical re ults. 
, he Poverty of Theory 
Many of us who have studied the economic theory of inter-
national trade-c~assical and neoclassical-come away im-
pressed with its lbgical elegance but· skeptical of its practical 
application. In thb most orthodox trade models, there is no 
aCknOWledgement!at all of colonialism or imperialism, developed 
and underdevelop d countries, technological differences, multi-
national corporations, or an International Monetary Fund. In 
the classical Ridrdian model of trade, there are numerous 
heroic assumptio~1 s which defy credibility. Among these are 
perfect competiti n, perfect knowledge, constant returns to 
scale, full employ ent, and the absence of capital and labor 
mobility in the "~wo-commodity, two-country" model. This 
abstract and exq1isitely refined model logically proves that 
increased speciali~ation and trade based upon comparative 
advantage will potentially benefit both nations in the model 
with increased e~iciency, production, and income. The free 
movement of goo9s across borders compensates for the immo-
bility of capital and labor, and only a situation of tariff-free 
trade is needed. Bbcause it is assumed that nation-states enter 
free trade volunta~ilY, they will either benefit or not trade. Yet, 
employment and jncome distribution-two key determinants 
of social welfarelare completely ignored in this paradigm. In 
the later Heckscher-Ohlin neoclassical model of trade, it was 
initially argued tHat social welfare would be maximized only 
if the winners co+pensated the losers for all losses incurred. 
This obstacle wa~ later surmounted with the introduction of 
"community-indi erence curves"-a most dubious solution to 
the problem. Pro hetically, the Heckscher-Ohlin model also 
allowed the free iJternational movement of capital, but not of 
labor. . 
Serious theor· tical problems arise when a more modern 
trade model uses rbalistic assumptions, such as imperfect com-
petition and incre1asing returns to scale. This contemporary, 
dynamic, oligopolirtic model of trade, which made its appear-
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ance in the late 1970s, is called the "new international 
economics." It demonstrates that, under the right circum-
stances, export subsidies and import restrictions (protec-
tionism) can both increase trade and raise the welfare of 
a nation-albeit often at the expense of other countries. The 
"strategic trade policy" stemming from this fashionable 
model requires that the government actively intervene in 
international markets by creating, subsidizing, and protec-
ting those national industries which have specific attri-
butes-namely, increasing returns to scale, positive external 
economies, advanced technology, and a high-income elas-
ticity of demand. Such multinational corporate products as 
electronics, automobiles, and petrochemicals all have these 
particular characteristics. In this model, therefore, protec-
tionist strategies are utilized to create comparative advantage, 
which is not assumed to be given or "endowed" as in the 
orthodox version. 
This "new international economics" came into vogue 
with the onset of the contemporary crisis and the phe-
nomenal rise of Japan in the global economy. The die was 
cast much earlier, however, when orthodox economists ob-
served that, to a disturbing degree, empirical results contra-
dicted their theoretical expectations. And so they aban-
doned their defense of these unrealistic assumptions (al-
though not the assumptions themselves), substituting in its 
place a new emphasis on "predictability." This evolution in 
orthodoxy began with the doctrine of so-called positive 
economics laid down in the 1930s by Nobel laureate Milton 
Friedman, one of the most conservative economists in the 
profession. In "The Methodology of Positive Economics," 
Friedman decreed that "theory is to be judged by its predic-
tive power ... [and} cannot be tested by comparing its 
assumptions directly with reality." 
But there are two problems with Friedman's assertion: 
not only are all neoclassical predictions still based upon 
unrealistic assumptions, but economists in general (as 
Friedman well knows) have a dislike for empirical investi-
gation. As Nobel laureate economist Wassily Leontief, a 
contemporary of Friedman, once tartly noted, "Nothing 
reveals the aversion of the great majority of the present-
day academic economists for systematic empirical inquiry 
more than the methodological devices they employ to avoid 
or cut short the use of concrete factual information." 
Orthodox trade theory, as outlined above, is a static con-
cept unrelated to economic development and based upon 
unrealistic assumptions not verified by empirical studies. It 
was developed and used by the dominant economic powers 
of the time (England and the United States) and both re-
flected and served their global economic and political inter-
ests. However, every country in the process of industrial-
izing has initially adopted "protectionist" export-promotion 
strategies. Those which completed the process earlier 
(England and the United States) then became advocates 
of neoclassical free trade, which best served their own 
economic interests. But those which industrialized later, such 
as Germany and Japan, rejected neoclassical free-trade policy 
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GLOSSARY OF ECONOMIC TERMS 
capital flight - the immediate and massive exodus of corporate and per-
sonal financial capital from a country to escape inflation, devaluation 
of the currency, and low profits domestically and to find security, 
stability, and higher profits abroad. In essence, it is the means by which 
corporate capital can "strike" to force policy changes upon a country. 
comparative advantage - an abstract, static concept of orthodox eco-
nomics which logically proves that, under the right conditions, each 
nation can potentially become more efficient and gain the most by 
specializing in and trading those goods which it produces most 
efficiently (or least inefficiently) relative to others, depending on its 
particular mix of land, labor, and capital. (This is often mistaken for 
absolute advantage, a situation in which one nation produces what 
another cannot.) Historically, this malleable concept has been 
extensively used by the dominant industrialized countries to justify 
exploitative trade relations with underdeveloped countries. 
export-platform plants - multinational corporate production facilities 
located in foreign (and domestic) cities and regions that produce goods 
for export. These plants are highly subsidized by the government and 
are exempt from most taxes and regulation. The Mexican maquiladores 
are examples of such plants. 
high income elasticity of demand - a characteristic of certain products 
such that the demand for the product changes (increases or decreases) 
by a greater percentage than changes in national income. Many luxury 
goods fall into this category. 
import substitution - a national policy of development which promotes 
domestic production by taxing or otherwise limiting foreign imports and 
by subsidizing domestic output. Many new or "infant" industries are 
provided such protection until' such time that they grow, mature, and 
can compete internationally. 
oligopoly - the domination of an industry or market by only a few large 
firms which have the power to fix output and prices and which often 
engage in monopolistic practices. At the very least, these firms are 
imperfectly competitive in theory and in practice. 
perfect competition - an abstract and ideal industry and market structure 
at the heart of neoclassical economics, which depicts production as 
resulting from an infinite, independent number of small firms producing 
homogeneous products so numerous that no one firm can fix or influence 
prices, which are determined only by market supply and demand. (This 
is Adam Smith's famous "invisible hand" which guarantees social benefit 
from the individual pursuit of self-interest.) 
positive external economies - benefits to an economy which result from 
the production of an individual plant or firm. Included among these are 
the creation oflinkages or related production, environmental improvement, 
and technological advances. (There are also negative external economies: 
pollution is the classic example.) 
returns to scale - originally an engineering concept applied to the size of 
production facilities, which explains how plants-when they are increased 
in size-initially give rise to increased output and lower average costs, 
then to constant output and costs, and, finally, to diminishing output 
. and higher costs. Recently, this technical term has been extensively (and 
improperly) used to justify monopolistic practices and large corporate 
profits. 
stabilization/structural adjustment - economic policies and programs forced 
upon developing nations and former socialist countries as conditions 
for receiving loans from the industrialized countries, the World Bank, 
and the International Monetary Fund. They include the sale of public 
assets, the lowering of wages, and austerity programs, and are pivotal 
new agenda designed to reinstate the global economic order of yesteryear. 
because they recognized that following this course would 
destine them to be second-class powers forever. 
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To comply with the dictates of free-trade policy, for 
example, the Japanese government was encouraged to pursue 
an internal laissez-faire policy, promote perfect competition, and 
open the country to foreign investment. Instead, Japan chose 
to develop its economy with national conglomerates (zaibat-
sus) which the government created, subsidized, and protected 
through the Ministry 
of International Trade 
and Industry. After its 
disastrous attempt to 
become an imperialistic 
colonial power prior to 
1945, Japan pursued 
export-promotion 
strategies through 
which it created com-
parative advantages in 
steel, petrochemicals, 
automobiles, and elec-
tronics. Thus, Japan 
demonstrated the 
merits of doing precise-
NAFTA is actually a 
retreat from global free 
trade and is designed 
to protect North 
American markets from 
further European and 
Asian encroachment. 
ly the opposite of what the Western world's leading neoclassical 
economists advocated. In fact, the Japanese model so resembles 
the "new international economics" that there can be little doubt 
these revisionist economists learned from the Japanese ex-
perience. In essence, the "new international economics" is a 
pragmatic response to Japan's challenge to U.S. hegemony in 
the global economy. 
NAFTA: Free Trade or Protectionism? 
What does this discussion of trade theory have to do with 
NAFTA? The answer is: just about everything. The dominant 
neoclassical paradigm has provided the intellectual rationale 
and justification for NAFTA, as it has for all the other eco-
nomic policies of the conservative governments of the United 
States, Canada, and Mexico. Decision-makers and technocrats 
in these three nations, educated and well-versed in this school 
of economics, all agree that free trade is always preferable to 
protectionism, that NAFTA is a free-trade tool, and that the . 
agreement will improve competition, employment, and growth 
rates in all three countries. 
These assertions are truly incredible when we are mind-
ful of the limitations of neoclassical trade theory, as well as 
the aversion of orthodox economists to empirical investigation. 
Only with a great deal of theoretical vulgarization can 
NAFTA's advocates lay claim to such potential benefits. Tech-
nical terms-such as competition, efficiency, increasing returns 
to scale, and comparative advantage-are not rigorously defined 
by NAFTA advocates and are often grossly distorted by them 
in order to make their promising predictions. In reality, neo-
classical economic rhetoric serves as a smokescreen for the pas-
sage of NAFTA. No other paradigm can do the job half as 
well; who, after all, can be opposed to an economic policy of 
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freedom and free lrade which, at least theoretically and a priori, 
guarantees such Ihappy results? 
The hidden agenda behind NAFTA is not revealed in 
orthodox trade theory or in official documents and proclama-
tions but, rather! in the revisionist theory and policy objec-
tives of the "n~w international economics." The theorists 
of this school have not discarded free trade entirely; it 
remains the idfal, although supplemented by a sophisticated 
interventionisF with all its limitations and dangers. And 
when one loo~ at the actual situation, it is difficult to argue 
that free tradf can be the primary objective of NAFTA, 
since trade betlween the three signatory nations has already 
been virtually ~eed of protection. Mexico, Canada, and the 
United States he all members ofGATI (the General Agree-
ment on Tra& and Tariffs). Canada and Mexico are the 
United State~' first- and third-largest trading partners, 
respectively. ~exico's average tariff is only 10 percent, while 
Canadian andl U.S. tariffs average about 4 percent. More-
over, these averages do not include the free trade which 
exists betweenl Mexico and the United States in maquiladore 
production anti between Canada and the United States in 
automobiles. ~o significant barriers to foreign investment 
or plant transfer~ have existed between the three countries 
since Mexico entered GATT in 1986 and President Salinas 
revised his countrr's investment laws shortly after assuming 
office in 1988. Slbuld these "reforms" continue, and should 
special agreementl between the three countries remove the few 
remaining barrierk to trade and capital movements, then we 
will have a de factb NAFTA in the absence of one de jure. One 
should therefore ~uestion the need for a free-trade agreement 
at all. I 
Nor are competitive markets an authentic goal of NAFTA. 
The orthodox th~oretical model of price competition, engaged 
in by a large number of small firms which do not advertise or 
restrict output, iJ not the type of rivalry practiced by multi-
national corporatibns. Oligopolistic multinationals today domi-
nate the economi~s of all three NAFTA countries. IfNAFTA 
accomplishes anthing, it will be to increase the mobility, 
market share, anCl profitability of these large firms at the 
expense of smallernd more competitive national ones. The ex-
pansion and stren¥,hening of massive North American multina-
tionals is one of t~e major objectives ofNAFTA, and increased 
intercorporate trage is what NAFTA will most likely give rise 
to. As such, the ~greement is designed to achieve the policy 
goals of the "nejw international economics" and not those of 
neoclassical free rade. . 
The Hid en Political and Economic 
Objectives of NAFTA 
I 
NAFTA is, therefore, actually a retreat from global free trade. ' 
It will create an ~merican trade bloc designed to accomplish 
two objectives: fdrst, protect North American continental 
markets from furtHer European and Asian encroachment in the 




and power of American multinational corporations in the long 
run. NAFTA is but the latest measure taken to retore the status 
quo ante (the international order circa 1890 to 1925) and US. 
global hegemony. NAFTA joins a number of similar maneuvers 
in the recent past designed to further this strategy, including 
the elimination of international commodity agreements; the 
termination of the Generalized System of Tariffs; and the eradi, _ 
cation of the Third World development model, which was 
founded upon import substitution, infant industry protection, 
and public enterprises. 
Politically, NAFTA will consolidate in a single international 
treaty the profoundly reactionary economic achievements of 
the 1980s in all three countries before their conservative gov, 
ernments exit from power. Including Mexico in this trilateral 
extension of the earlier Free Trade Agreement between the 
United States and Canada can be viewed as a reward for the 
Mexican government's support of the Brady Plan, as well as 
compliance with the IMF's conditional,loan programs and the 
implementation of so'called economic reforms. Beyond this, 
NAFTA reflects the extraordinary power of multinational cor' 
porations (predominantly from the United States) to set na' 
tional and international policy in all three countries. NAFTA 
also has the hidden objectives of stemming the flow of illegal 
immigration from Mexico to the United States and perpetuating 
Mexico's brutal one'party "democracy." 
Economically, NAFTA is designed to enhance and protect 
the power of American multinationals and their exploitation 
of old and new markets on the continent. US. corporations 
will undoubtedly increase their domination over this expand, 
ed market once NAFTA is signed. Their franchises can be ex, 
pected to expand into Canada as well as Mexico, and more 
manufacturing plants will be shifted from the north to the 
south. Export'platform plants in Asia and in Central and South 
America will also be moved into this free'trade zone (ai, 
though not to the United States) to take advantage of, 
among other things, lower transportation costs. 
Potential Costs and Benefits of NAFTA 
These trends are already evident, even before ratification 
of the agreement, and they are but the first of the struc' 
tural changes that will be induced by NAFTA. In 1990, 
for example, there were only 10 foreign franchises operating 
in Mexico. With changes in Mexican investment laws, the 
number of foreign franchises increased to 125 by 1992, with 
950 outlets throughout the country. Over the last five years, 
US. manufacturers have invested $11.6 billion in Mexican 
plants; more than 250,000 cars assembled in Mexico (or 
about 85 percent) have been exported back to the United 
States. The number of Mexican small businesses and US. 
workers replaced by these capital movements are among the 
social costs which have been conveniently ignored in the typical 
discussions of NAFTA. 
Because of the mar~ed wage disparity betweeen Mexico, 
on the one hand, and the United States and Canada, on the 
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other, corporations can realize significant cost reductions by 
moving their capital and plants to the south. Hourly manufac' 
turing wages in the United States and Canada average about 
$15, as compared with $2 in Mexico. The multinational cor' 
porate strategy, therefore, is to increase profits through lower 
wage costs, fixed prices, and increased market shares-not 
through product innovation, technological advances, or 
economies of scale in production. 
Those who claim that wages will be equalized or that the 
price of commodities traded in the region will be reduced any 
time soon are in for a few surprises. Such scenarios, derived 
from neoclassical trade models, defy credibility in the oligo, 
polistic world in which we live and would void the coveted 
benefits and corporate profits of NAFTA. It is not likely that 
the anticipated movement of capital and jobs to Mexico will 
significantly increase wages due to that country's huge number 
of unemployed and underemployed laborers. The border rna' 
quiladores, which employ about 500,000 Mexican workers, 
already pay less than the average manufacturing wage in Mexico 
(and in Asia). These multinational corporate assembly plants 
currently pay money wages as low as 57 cents an hour and 
total wages-including benefits-of about $1.15. 
If the rnaquiladores are the vanguard of what NAFTA will 
bring, they do not portend well for the workers of Mexico, 
Canada, or the United States. This transfer of manufacturing 
and other production facilities to Mexico will weaken labor 
unions in the United States and Canada and have a depress' 
ing effect upon real wages-not enough to discourage illegal 
immigration from Mexico to the United States but enough to 
increase the profits of American corporations. Moreover, the 
mere threat of transferring plants to Mexico has already ob, 
tained wage concessions from workers in the United States 
and Canada. And while the number of abysmally paid Mexican 
NAFTA reflects the 
extraordinary power 
of multinational 
corporations to set 
national and 
international policy in 
all three countries. 
workers employed by 
US. corporations has 
increased, employment 
by these very same 
firms in the United 
States and Canada has 
decreased-as have 
real wages in both 
countries. Canada, for 
example, lost more 
than 300,000 jobs-13 
percent of its total 
manufacturing employ, 
ment-since the Free 
Trade Agreement was 
signed; this occurred 
despite the fact that US. corporations doubled their invest' 
ments in Canada between 1986 and 1990, from about $50 
billion to over $100 billion. The recently released International 
1fade Commission's report on the potential impacts ofNAFTA 
showed job loss in the United States as "low" as 145,000 by 
1995 and as high as 490,000 by the year 2000. The net in' 
crease in US. jobs after NAFTA (based upon rather optimistic 
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growth, investment, and trade assumptions) was estimated to 
be as low as 0.03 percent of the labor force, or only 35,000 
jobs by 1995. 
For Mexico, NAFTA is an opportunity to attract to its 
economy the private capital which fled the country during the 
1980s; to compensate for the reduced public loans which have 
been diverted to East' 
ern European coun, 
tries by the IMF; and 
to join an exclusive, 
powerful trade bloc in 
the hemisphere. The 
NAFTA-like "pro'mar' 
ket" reforms of the 
Salinas administration 
already have lured bil, 
lions of dollars back to 
Mexico. Since 1989, 
the Mexican stock ex, 
change has increased 
sevenfold; this expan' 
sion was fueled by the 
NAFTA could give rise 
to a trade war among 
the world's three 
emerging blocs: North 
America, the European 
Economic Community, 
and the Asian bloc. 
"privatization" (sale) of public enterprises such as TELMEX, 
the national telecommunications system. Mexico will pay at 
least part of its massive foreign debt by selling such public assets 
to private businesses. For example, the Mexican government 
sold TELMEX for $3.7 billion and exchanged that money for 
$7.2 billion of discounted Mexican debt. Privatized TELMEX 
now has a stock value of $28 billion-but the phones in the 
country do not operate any more efficiently, and neither real 
investment nor employment has been increased by this specula' 
tive activity. PEMEX, the national petroleum irldustry, is soon 
to suffer the same fate: already the retail gas stations have been 
privatized, and 50,000 workers-about 25 percent ofPEMEX's 
labor force-have been laid off over the last three years. 
What does this tell us about investment and free'trade 
agreements? First, that speculative investment may be attracted 
by a nation without an agreement, giving rise to no increase 
in production or employment, as in the case of Mexico and 
its recent stock-market boom. Second, that real investment may 
be attracted and give rise to increased employment but not to 
increased real wages, again without a trade agreement, as has 
also occurred in Mexico. Third, that a free'trade agreement 
may give rise to increased investment but also' to decreased 
employment and wages, as in Canada. Finally, that a free'trade 
agreement may result in decreased investment; employment, and 
wages, as in the United States. 
What does this tell us about NAFTA? It is abundantly 
clear that NAFTA will give rise to a major redistribution of 
income and wealth-not so much from country to country as 
from one socioeconomic class to another. More specifically, 
NAFTA will undoubtedly redistribute income from wage and 
salaried workers to the propertied elite in Mexico, Canada, 
and the United States. We know this already from the recent 
experience of Mexico with its corporate maquiladores and 
investment "reforms," and from the effects of the Free Trade 
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Agreement betwln the United States and Canada. This alone 
would constitute I a success for the architects of NAFTA. In 
the final analysis, ~t is not countries or corporations but, rather, 
the propertied elfte in all three nations who are the driving 
force behind thiS agreement-and who will be NAFTA's 
ultimate and perhaps only beneficiaries. 
The long,tierm economic objective ofNAFTA, also ob, 
scured, is to iJcrease the bargaining position and strength 
of American f,lUltinational corporations vis'a,vis Europe 
(Germany) an? Asia Gapan). Failures in the bilateral trade 
talks withJap~n over the past couple of years, and the more 
recent collapsr of GATT negotiations with the European 
community~. Brussels, have left the American multi, 
nationals with few other trade options. The trade,diverting 
effects of N TA will be profound and will affect not only 
Japan and the European Community but also the develop, 
ing countries f Asia and Latin America. 
. In the ablnce of retaliation from Europe and Asia, 
NAFTA does have the potential for improving the profita, 
bility and glob I market share of North American corpora, 
tions. NAFT1' however, could also give rise to a trade war 
among the world's three emerging blocs: North America, 
the European Eronomic Community, and the Asian bloc 
centered on Japan. According to Paul Krugman, one of the 
founders of the 'jnew international economics," a trade war 
would not be the risaster that orthodox trade theorists claim: 
And let's sURPose that each of these trading blocs 
becomes highly protectionist, imposing a tariff against 
goods from outside the bloc of 100 percent, which we 
suppose leads I to a fall in imports of 50 percent .... 
A trade war 1hat cut international trade in half, and 
which caused ~ average cost of wasted resources for the 
displaced prod~ction of, say, 50 percent, would therefore 
cost the worlCl economy only 2.5 percent of its in' 
come .... (It if roughly the cost of a 1 percent increase 
in the unemplrment rate.) 
To avoid this~npleasant scenario, which would have nega' 
tive political as ell as economic repercussions and perhaps 
lead to a global c nflict, NAFTA could first be expanded to 
include all nationJ in the hemisphere-that is, a Pan,American 
Free Trade Agreetnent. NAFTA's provisions differ from those 
of the European Etonomic Community and GATT in a number 
of significant wayJ, and the agreement could conceivably serve 
I 
as a useful new ~lOdel for global free trade. However, these 
outcomes are not ~ediately obtainable, and they are certainly 
not the objective~ of the new "strategic trade policy" being 
pursued by the ch[ef executive officers of the American multi, 
nationals. 
The, "lose-lose" Scenario 
In conclusion, it is extremely difficult to quantitatively estimate 
the impact of NtFTA upon the economies of the United 
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States, Canada, and Mexico should it be ratified and imple, 
mented. A priori calculations of increased trade, employment, 
and income are little more than educated guesses founded upon 
questionable assumptions. Also, the negative aspects of 
NAFTA are grossly underestimated and often ignored. To 
disregard them gives only a biased and exaggerated appraisal 
ofNAFTA's potential benefits. The unintended outcome could 
be less for everyone (the little,mentioned "lose,lose" scenario) 
if aggregate demand decreases, if the global crisis worsens, if 
a trade war erupts, or if Mexico does not develop. 
Unless Mexico is granted special concessions to protect 
and develop its economy, another paradoxical result of NAFTA 
will be the "development of underdevelopment." Both the 
progressive economic paradigm and the "new international 
economics," as well as the historic example of Japan, argue 
against Mexico pursuing a NAFTA-type strategy of foreign 
investment, deregulation, and free trade. By international 
treaty, NAFTA will preclude Mexico from undertaking indus, 
trial planning, infant industry protection, land reform, and 
income redistribution, while increasing dependency and the 
domination of the Mexican economy by foreign multinational 
corporations. Cultural preservation and sustainable agriculture 
will also cease to be options for Mexico after NAFTA is signed. 
Most adversely affected will be the ejidos (small farms), 
the beneficiaries of the Mexican revolution. Agribusiness will 
replace them, imported corn will be substituted for domestic 
production, and, in the process, these small landowners will 
be pushed off the land and forced to become itinerant laborers-
unwelcome either in Mexican cities or across the border in the 
United States. 
The orthodox trade'theory concept of comparative advan' 
tage ignores stages of development in nations and directs under, 
developed countries to specialize in the production and export 
of their raw materials to industrialized nations. As such, 
Mexico's peripheral status in the new world order will be set 
in concrete by NAFTA. The U.S.-Mexican border will con' 
" 
tinue to divide an underdeveloped country from a developed 
one. For poor Mexican laborers, this border will still bar them 
from a better life, and illegal immigration to the United States 
will continue. For American multinational corporations and 
those who own them, however, even this (already minimal) 
obstruction to income and wealth accumulation will be 
eliminated. 
/Neither NAFTA nor neo,liberal "market reforms;' nor suc, 
cess in future GATT negotiations, will be the panacea for the 
global economic crisis that their proponents claim. If success 
at GATT raises global income by the estimated $100 billion 
annually, and NAFTA by just a fraction of that amount-about 
$20 billion, distributed unequally among nations and socio' 
economic classes-the suspicion arises that NAFTA is not 
really concerned with furthering free trade, efficiency, or 
growth. NAFTA is, in fact, little more than the latest strategy 
of orthodox economists and conservative politicians to re' 
distribute income and wealth from the many to the few and 
from the poorest to the richest countries and classes. 
The rhetoric and disguised politics of orthodox neoclassical 
economics, a vulgarization of the theory, and an unsatisfac, 
tory, somewhat dishonest fabrication of statistics have been 
combined to convince the public that everyone will win with 
NAFTA. But if the past is any guide to the future, some will 
win, some will lose, and the winners will not compensate the 
losers. This is already the legacy of monetarist high,interest 
rates, privatization, deregulation, stabilization, and structural 
adjustment. There is every reason to expect that NAFTA will 
yield more of the same. :~; 
Melvin Bur~e is a professor of economics at the University of 
Maine. He is also the head of Practical Progressive Consultants, 
Inc. An earlier, expanded version of this article was presented at 
the international symposium "Beyond N.AFTA: Financial Inte, 
gration and Development," held at the Universidad N.acional 
Autonoma de Mexico in Mexico City on January 20-22, 1993. 
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